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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal and cross-appeal arise from a civil action brought by Plaintiffs for breach of 
contract, for quantum meruit, for equitable estoppel, for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, and for fraud against a corporation (Overland Development Corp. — 
hereinafter "Overland") which failed to close on the purchase of a parcel of real property owned 
by the Plaintiffs despite a written contract therefor — and which corporation also failed to pay the 
two required $15,000 nonrefundable earnest money deposits required by the parties' agreement, 
and under the same causes of action against the principal of Overland, Kenneth Holman 
("Holman"), on an alter ego theory and also as a direct participant in the alleged fraud, and for 
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for 
fraud against the Brunettis' real estate agent, Gilbert Turner ("Turner"). 
Jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah from which this 
appeal arises, is based on U.C.A. 78-3-4(l)(1953, as amended). 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)(j)(1995 Supp.) 
and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This case was poured over to the Court 
of Appeals by the Supreme Court on May 15, 1997. 
The Appellant Overland appealed the granting of a motion for partial summary judgment 
entered on June 23, 1995 in favor of the Plaintiffs/Appellees, the Brunettis, on their breach of 
contract claim. In a serous lack of candor, Overland failed to fully disclose in its brief that after 
the trial in this matter (on Fraud, Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
and Breach of Fiduciary Duty), Overland asked the trial court to reconsider the earlier granting of 
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partial summary judgment in light of the evidence adduced at trial — raising in said motion 
essentially the same arguments raised in this appeal. The parties fully briefed these issues, with 
recitations to trial testimony. The trial court heard argument on this motion to reconsider and for 
summary judgment. The trial court rejected Overland's arguments, affirmed the judgment and 
denied Overland's motion in an Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Reconsider the Order 
Granting Partial Summary Judgment entered on October 17, 1997. In essence, these issues have 
already been "tried" — and need no new trial. 
The Cross-Appeal addresses three issues (1) the trial court's refusal at trial to allow 
plaintiffs to amend their pleadings to conform to the evidence as to additional instances of fraud 
by Overland and Holman, and refusal to receive evidence on said matters; (2) the trial court's 
ruling after trial that Overland did not breach its covenant of good faith and fair dealing such that 
attorney's fees should be awarded to the Brunettis; and (3) the trial court's rulings that Turner 
neither breached his fiduciary duty to the Brunettis, nor his duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
These rulings were made final in the judgment entered on December 17, 1997 (prior to this "final 
judgment," the Brunetti filed a motion for reconsideration on the issues of breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; this motion has never been ruled upon, but the Utah 
Supreme Court, Justice Zimmerman, denied the Brunettis' motion for summary disposition and 
ruled that this appeal should proceed even though this motion to reconsider has never been ruled 
on by the trial court). 
Overland filed its first Notice of Appeal on January 2,1997 and an Amended Notice of 
Appeal on January 13, 1997. The Brunettis filed their Notice of Cross-Appeal on January 24, 
1997. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Prologue. Judge Peuler granted in part the cross-motions of the parties prior to trial 
herein. Judge Peuler found that the parties had entered into a real estate purchase agreement 
which required Overland to either purchase the Brunettis' property for $895,000 within 120 days, 
or an additional period of 60 days if "needed" or "required," or to pay the Brunettis two $15,000 
non-refundable earnest monies as liquidated damages, and granted the Brunettis partial summary 
judgment based thereon. Having granted the Brunettis this partial summary judgment, Judge 
Peuler dismissed the Brunettis' claims of alter ego, quantum meruit and equitable estoppel. With 
respect to the dismissal of the quantum meruit and equitable estoppel claims, Judge Peuler 
specifically stated that since these claims were theories of relief alternative to that upon which 
she had already granted summary judgment, they were superfluous. Consequently, if the 
contractual summary judgment in favor of the Brunettis is reversed as requested by Overland, 
these other theories of relief7claims should be revived and allowed to go forward as alternate 
theories of recovery. 
Subsequent to the ruling on the motions for summary judgment, a trial was had on the 
issues of fraud, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of 
fiduciary duty, in which testimony was received from all parties relating to the formation of the 
agreement at issue and the performance, or alleged lack of performance, of the obligations of the 
parties with respect to said agreement. After this trial, Judge Peuler ruled against the Brunettis 
on these additional claims (which ruling is the subject of the Brunettis' cross-appeal). Overland 
then filed a motion for reconsideration and/or for summary judgment in which Overland raised 
essentially the same arguments raised in this appeal, and asked Judge Peuler to reconsider and set 
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aside her earlier granting of partial summary judgment in light of "the evidence" heard at the 
trial. Judge Peuler considered Overland's arguments, and reviewed the evidence that she had 
received at trial, heard argument from counsel, and based thereon reaffirmed the summary 
judgment which had been granted to the Brunettis on the contract claim for the two $15,000 
nonrefundable earnest monies. Obviously, Judge Peuler felt like the evidence at trial supported 
her prior ruling that the agreement was unambiguous, that it required Overland to either buy the 
property or pay the nonrefundable earnest monies, and that the purported "joint venture" was 
merely a proposed illegal sham which Overland should not be allowed to raise as a possible 
means of escaping its obligations under the contract. 
Consequently, the judgment in favor of the Brunettis for liquidated damages due to 
Overland's failure to close on the purchase of the Brunettis' property should be affirmed for two 
reasons: (1) Judge Peuler was correct in her analysis of the contract and the obligations which it 
imposed upon the parties when she first granted the summary judgment, and (2) after hearing 
evidence at the trial herein, Judge Peuler decided that said evidence supported her prior ruling 
that the Brunettis were entitled to judgment against Overland for breach of contract. 
Issues Presented — Overland's Appeal 
1. Was it correct or not clearly erroneous for Judge Peuler to find that the real estate 
purchase agreement was an unconditional agreement by Overland to purchase the real property 
for $895,000 within 120 days, or an additional 60 days, or pay the Brunettis two $15,000 
nonrefundable earnest monies? 
2. Was it correct or not clearly erroneous for Judge Peuler to find that Overland's 
agreement to purchase the property was not contingent upon Overland closing a construction 
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loan, or upon any other contingency? 
3. Was it correct or not clearly erroneous for Judge Peuler to find that the Brunettis 
had not breached the agreement by failing to enter into the sham and illegal joint venture 
agreement which Overland had proposed? 
Standard for Review — Overland Appeal. It is the Brunettis' position that the standard 
of review is not one of "correctness" of the legal rulings, Kimball v. Campbell 699 P. 2d 714 
(Utah 1985), but is one of whether there was sufficient evidence presented at the trial to support 
Judge Peuler's decision after trial to affirm the prior granting of summary judgment when she 
denied Overland's motion for reconsideration and/or for summary judgment such that the 
decision was not "clearly erroneous." Stewart v. State By and Through Deland. 830 P. 2d 306 
(Ut. App. 1992). If this is in fact the standard, then Overland's appeal must be summarily denied 
because Overland has not marshaled the evidence on these issues. 
Statement of Issues — Brunettis5 Cross-Appeal. 
1. Was it reversible error for Judge Peuler to refuse to allow the Brunettis to amend 
their pleadings to include examples of fraudulent conduct beyond the pleadings but which had 
been actually litigated in connection with the cross-motions for partial summary judgment and 
then again during the trial, albeit on other issues? 
2. Was it reversible error for Judge Peuler to find that there was no evidence of a 
violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Overland, and thereby refuse 
to award to the Brunettis their attorney's fees as consequential damages? 
3. Was it reversible error for Judge Peuler to find that there was no evidence of a 
violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Turner, and thereby refuse to 
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award to the Brunettis any damages, including their attorney's fees as consequential damages? 
4. Was it reversible error for Judge Peuler to find that there was no evidence of a 
breach of fiduciary duty on the part of Turner, and thereby refuse to award to the Brunettis any 
damages therefor, including their attorney's fees as consequential damages? 
Standard of Review — Cross-Appeal — With respect to the first issue, the standard is 
one of whether Judge Peuler's ruling, as a matter of law, was correct. No deference is given to 
Judge Peuler's ruling. Kimball v. Campbell 699 P. 2d 714 (Utah 1985) With respect to the 
other issues, the standard is whether there was insufficient evidence to support Judge Peuler's 
findings such that the findings were clearly erroneous. Deference is given to Judge Peuler's 
factual rulings. Stewart v. State Bv and Through Deland. 830 P. 2d 306 (Ut. App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Overland seeks to read into the simple language of the agreement obligations and 
contingencies that simply are not present. This is in fact a very simple case. Overland wrote a 
letter offering to purchase the property for $850,000 within 120 to 180 days, and stating that an 
initial $15,000 earnest money would be deposited in an independent trust account, and that if 
additional time was needed to close on the purchase, a second $15,000 "nonrefundable earnest 
money" would be deposited in trust and the first $15,000 deposit would be released to the 
Brunettis and that Overland would have an additional 180 days to close on the purchase. The 
letter also stated that the Brunettis would be asked to enter into a "joint venture" agreement so 
that Overland could represent that the property had been "contributed," but that there would be a 
separate agreement abrogating the "joint venture'Vcontribution concept by requiring that the 
property actually be paid for in cash at the closing. The Brunettis testified at trial that they asked 
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Turner about this, objecting to anything other than being paid in full at closing for their property, 
and that Turner assured them that the "joint venture" was not a real joint venture and that they 
would be paid in full and would not be required to actually contribute their property to any sort 
of partnership. Based upon this explanation of the language of Overland's proposal, the 
Brunettis proceeded with the negotiations. 
The Brunettis countered with a higher purchase price of $895,00 and shorter periods in 
which to close, and the parties finally agreed upon a price of $895,000, an initial time to close of 
120 days, and with a second time period to close of 60 days. 
Overland gave Turner a check made out for $15,000 as the initial earnest money deposit, 
together with a letter asking that Turner hold off for a short while before depositing the check. 
This check was never deposited in trust as required by the agreement. Turner approached 
Overland and obtained an agreement that if he could arrange for the acquisition of a second 
parcel owned by the Brunettis immediately adjacent to the property subject to the purchase 
agreement, Turner would be a partner or participant in the development of the larger 
development. Rather than prepare plans for, and make attempts to develop the property subject 
to the purchase agreement, Overland and Turner developed a site plan for the larger development 
and submitted it to Salt Lake City for review with a request for rezoning. 
When the first 120 day time period came to a close, Overland complained that it had not 
been successful in moving the development forward and asked for an extension of time to pursue 
the project, but without having to pay any money therefor. Overland also expressly told the 
Brunettis that they were not yet required to enter in to the "joint venture" agreement and would 
not be required to do so until further notice, and again assured them that it was not a real joint 
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venture. 
The Brunettis refused to modify the agreement. Overland asked for and received the 
return from Turner of the first $15,000 earnest money check. Since Overland neither bought the 
property nor paid the two $15,000 nonrefundable earnest monies to the Brunettis, the Brunettis 
brought the underlying suit herein. 
As indicated previously, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Judge 
Peuler granted the motions in part and denied them in part. The Brunettis submitted deposition 
and documentary testimony in opposition to Overland's and Holman's motions for summary 
judgment on the fraud claims that (1) contrary to the representations in the letter offering to 
purchase the Brunettis' property, Overland was a brand new company with no development 
history whatsoever, (2) that Overland had very little assets at the time that it entered into the 
purchase contract (only a few items of office furniture), and did not have the cash to pay the first 
$15,000 earnest money unless it could borrow the same somewhere, and (3) that Overland and 
Holman knew that Overland did not have the wherewithal or track record to be able to obtain 
financing and close on the purchase, but would need to obtain a joint venture partner. The Court 
denied Overland's motion to dismiss the Brunettis' fraud claims. At trial, when the Brunettis 
sought to present evidence on these same matters, Judge Peuler refused to receive it — claiming 
that the pleadings did not encompass these instances of fraud. The Brunettis brought a motion to 
amend to conform to the evidence which had already been received in connection with the 
motions for summary judgment, arguing that these issues had already been litigated. Judge 
Peuler denied the motion. During the trial, as evidence pertinent to these issues came in on other 
matters (such as on the issue of bad faith or to show lack of credibility), the Brunettis again asked 
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the Court to amend the pleadings to conform to this evidence. Judge Peuler steadfastly refused — 
ruling that she would only consider evidence relating to the first $15,000 earnest money check, 
and the fact that it was without sufficient funds, as to whether Overland had defrauded the 
Brunettis — whereas the Brunettis claimed that Overland's April 6, 1990 letter/offer had created 
the false impression that Overland was a substantial corporation fully capable of fulfilling its 
obligations under the purchase agreement, when the truth was that Overland was a newly formed 
company, with no history, no assets and not even enough money to fund the first promised 
$15,000 earnest money deposit and would have no prospect of completing the sale without 
finding a substantial financial partner. The Brunettis asserted in their opposition to the motions 
for summary judgment that if they had known of these true facts, they never would have dealt 
with Overland. 
After trial, Overland asked Judge Peuler to set aside the summary judgment in light of the 
evidence heard at trial ~ which Judge Peuler refused to do. These appeals thereafter were 
undertaken. The Brunettis ask this appellate court to affirm the granting of judgment against 
Overland for the two $15,000 nonrefundable earnest monies, and further to reverse Judge 
Peuler's decision to refuse to allow the Brunettis to present evidence and seek relief on the full 
breadth of Overland's fraudulent conduct as developed in the motions for summary judgment on 
the grounds that the pleadings should have been amended to conform to the evidence, and that 
the issues had actually been tried by the parties in connection with the motions for summary 
judgment. 
With respect to Judge Peuler's finding after trial that there was no breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Overland, the Brunettis cross-appealed on the grounds 
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that the evidence was without dispute that: (a) Overland did not make the first $15,000 deposit 
into an independent trust account as required by the agreement, (b) Overland did not pursue the 
original development, but changed course mid-stream and started working on the larger project 
in concert with Gilbert Turner (the Brunettis' erstwhile real estate agent), (c) Overland 
unilaterally declared the agreement terminated when the Brunettis refused to modify it to give 
Overland more time without having to pay any earnest monies; (d) despite knowing that the 
Brunettis had refused to modify the agreement and had refused to enter into a new agreement 
including both of their parcels of real property, Overland wrote a false letter to the Brunettis 
stating that it appreciated the fact that the Brunettis had agreed to terminate the relationship; (e) 
Overland asked Turner to return its $15,000 check which had never been deposited, which 
Turner did. These facts are without dispute. Furthermore, Overland's positions in this litigation 
and on this appeal are so obviously merit less that they also constitute violations of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Based upon the foregoing, it was clearly erroneous for 
Judge Peuler to find that there was no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and to fail to award the Brunettis as damages therefor their attorney's fees herein. 
Similarly, the Brunettis request this Court, to find that it was clearly erroneous for Judge 
Peuler to find that Turner did not breach his fiduciary duty to the Brunettis, and violate the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, by (a) receiving the first $15,000 earnest money check 
and not depositing it in his trust account as required by the agreement, (b) negotiating a joint 
venture with Overland for the development of the larger project, (c) supporting Overland in its 
attempts to get the Brunettis to modify the original agreement on favorable terms to Overland so 
as to benefit Turner's arrangement with Overland, (d) giving the $15,000 check back to Overland 
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despite knowing that his principals, the Brunettis, had expressly demanded that Overland pay the 
same to them. Again, the foregoing facts were admitted and not in dispute. Based upon them, it 
was clearly erroneous for Judge Peuler to rule that Gilbert Turner did not breach his fiduciary 
duty as the Brunettis' real estate agent and that he did not act in bad faith. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Brunettis were the owners of two parcels of land at approximately North 
Temple and Redwood Road. The eastern most parcel consisted of approximately 5.33 acres and 
had a private club (the Norwood Club) located on its eastern frontage (the "Eastern Parcel"). The 
western parcel consisted of approximately 6 acres which was entirely vacant (the "Western 
Parcel"). The first, Eastern Parcel, is the property which became subject to a purchase agreement 
with Overland. R. 117. 
2. In late 1989 or early 1990, Gilbert Turner obtained an agreement from the 
Brunettis that he could act as their real estate agent with respect to finding a buyer for the Eastern 
Parcel. R. 117 and 759. 
3. On or about April 6, 1990, Overland wrote a letter to Turner offering to purchase 
the Eastern Parcel (R. 117), which stated the following: 
"Dear Mr. Turner: 
Overland Development Company would like to purchase the 5.33 (+ or -) acres, Parcel 
No. 38019-0000, located on North Temple west of Redwood Road. The terms of the 
purchase are slightly different from the normal Earnest Money Agreement that is 
presented, however, we have found our approach to be very sound and profitable for both 
the landowner and the developer. Over the past 6 years we have developed over $30 
million of real estate using this method. Our proposal is as follows: 
Overland Development Company would agree to purchase the property for an agreed 
price of $850,000. Included in the purchase price is the assignment of the private club 
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license and purchase of the existing building, excluding inventory. A $15,000 earnest 
money would be deposited in an independent trust account to be credited to the purchase 
price at the time of closing with the balance being paid from the proceeds of the 
construction loan. Overland would then enter into a joint venture agreement with the 
landowner, within two weeks, to develop the property. It would be Overland's 
responsibility to pay for all the development and approval costs, including: a feasibility 
study; an appraisal; environmental studies; engineering drawings; architectural drawings; 
city approvals; and all other costs incident to the development of the property for the 
purpose of building a hotel and restaurant/club. 
The landowner would agree to permit Overland Development Company, or another entity 
to which Overland assigns its interest, to represent to the City and to lending institutions 
that the land has been contributed to the partnership. This enables Overland to establish 
an equity position in the deal to comply with the lending institutions requirements. 
Overland, by separate agreement, would agree to pay the landowner the agreed upon 
price, in cash, at the closing of the construction loan. 
The benefit of a joint venture relationship of this type is that it enables the developer to 
use it's limited resources on the development of the property instead of the purchase of 
the land. This also reduces some of the risk of the developer and gives assurance that the 
project can be consummated before the expiration of the agreement. 
Under the conventional method of purchasing a property, the landowner, usually, would 
be required to accept an earnest money agreement which had enough contingencies in the 
agreement to insure that the developer could develop the property. In most cases, the 
length of time to close the deal would be about the same. It is estimated that the 
construction loan and all approvals can be obtained within 120 to 180 days, however, if 
additional time is needed the developer agrees to release the original $15,000 earnest 
money to the landowner and to deposit an additional $15,000 nonrefundable earnest 
money for an additional extension of 180 days. It is the intention of the developer to 
proceed with the development as rapidly as possible. Any delays in the process will 
likely be due to delays in obtaining City approvals. 
Sincerely, 
Kenneth T. Holman 
President 
What kind of "joint venture" did this agreement propose/require? One in which (a) Overland is 
"permit[ted]... to represent to the City and lending institutions that the land has been contributed 
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to the partnership" so that Overland can mislead the lending institutions into thinking that 
Overland has "an equity position in the deal to comply with the lending institutions 
requirements," but (2) in actuality "Overland, by separate agreement, would agree to pay the 
landowner the agreed upon price, in cash, at the closing of the construction loan." This is not a 
real joint venture. It is a sham, one designed to allow Overland to commit fraud upon its 
proposed lending institutions — which is probably the reason that Overland, in an incredible lack 
of candor to this Court, failed to quote this portion of the language of its April 6, 1990 letter/offer 
in the body of its brief (See Overland's Brief, p. 7) (A copy of the April 6,1990 letter/offer is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A) 
4. The Brunettis reviewed this offer with Turner and were not interested in being in 
any real joint venture which required an actual contribution of their property. They wanted to be 
paid in full for their property. Turner assured the Brunettis that it was not a real joint venture, 
that there would be a firm "separate agreement" requiring Overland to pay them in full for their 
property at the closing. R. 649. 
5. Based upon this construction of the offer, which is clear and unambiguous on its 
face to anyone with a legal, real estate and/or banking background, the Brunettis agreed to the 
offer subject to the following modification offered by way of an Addendum/Counteroffer: 
"The terms and conditions of the letter dated April 6, 1990, are acceptable with the 
following changes: 
1) The price shall be $895,000 
2) The initial contract term shall be for 120 days. Should additional time be 
required, the developer agrees to release the original $15,000 earnest money to the 
seller and replace it with another $15,000 non refundable earnest money for an 
additional 60 days." 
Overland accepted this modification on May 7,1990. R. 568 (A copy of this 
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Addendum/Counteroffer is attached hereto as Exhibit B). 
This agreement is simple. Overland agreed to purchase the Eastern Parcel for $895,000 within 
120 days. A $15,000 earnest money deposit was to be made immediately into an independent 
trust account. During the 120 days, Overland represented that it would undertake normal 
development activities (apply for rezoning, get plans, arrange for financing, etc. — all at its 
expense). If Overland "needed" or "required" (not "requested — as Overland now in bad faith 
argues) more than 120 days to complete its efforts and to close on the purchase of the property, it 
was required to release the first $15,000 to the Brunettis and to deposit an "additional $15,000 
nonrefundable earnest money" in trust. Thereafter Overland would have an additional 60 days to 
complete its activities preparatory to closing on the purchase, and to close on the purchase. If 
Overland did not close on the purchase of the Eastern Parcel within this next 60 days, Overland 
would be in breach of the agreement. The Brunettis elected as their remedy for this breach of 
contract to sue for the liquidated damages embodied in the two promised $15,000 nonrefundable 
earnest money deposits R. 965 (as alternative remedies, the Brunettis asserted quantum meruit — 
i.e., that the benefit derived by Overland from the Brunettis from having the exclusive right to 
pursue development of the Brunettis' property for the specified time period equals the sum of the 
two $15,000 nonrefundable earnest monies; and equitable estoppel R. 1-12; which theories must 
be restored if this Court orders that the matter go back to trial on the contract issue). 
6. Upon execution of the Addendum/Counteroffer, Overland delivered a check to 
Turner for $15,000, together with a letter asking Turner to hold off for a while before depositing 
the check. R. 173 and 504 Holman testified that he did not have the money to cover the check 
and was trying to get a loan to cover it. R. 338-339 The check was never deposited. R. 504 
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7. The Brunettis testified that they were never shown the letter asking that the check 
not yet be deposited, and that if they had known that Overland did not have enough resources to 
cover a $15,000 check, they would not have entered into an agreement to sell them their property 
for $895,000. R. 339-340. 
8. Holman and Turner testified that shortly thereafter they discussed a possible joint 
venture involving the development of both of the Brunettis' properties ~ i.e., both the Eastern 
Parcel and the Western Parcel R. 996, pp. 139-140 and 185-186. Holman testified that he told 
Turner that Turner could participate in the development if he could help pull it together. R. 996, 
pp. 185-186 
9. A proposed development plan for this larger property/project was prepared and 
submitted to Salt Lake City officials even though Overland and Turner had no agreement from 
the Brunettis as to the additional property and even though they were supposed to be trying to 
rezone and develop the Eastern Parcel for development. R. 996, pp. 128-134 and 190-193 By so 
doing, Turner compromised himself and ceased to be exclusively loyal to the Brunettis. 
Thereafter Turner had a financial incentive to assist Overland at the possible expense of the 
Brunettis. Neither Turner nor Overland disclosed this conflict of interest to the Brunettis — it 
was only discovered during the course of this litigation. R. 339 and 996, p. 146 
10. Just before the expiration of the first 120 day time period to close, Overland wrote 
the Brunettis a letter (dated August 25, 1990), which sought a modification to the agreement. R. 
173. Three paragraphs of this letter are of critical importance to the instant appeal. The first 
paragraph sets forth the nature of the agreement exactly as the Brunettis understood it: 
"On May 9, 1990, you and your wife, Florence, accepted an offer I made to Purchase 5 (+ or 
15 
-) acres located at North Temple near Redwood Road for $895,000. The agreement gave me 
120 days to complete the sale. If I needed additional time I would be required to release the 
original $15,000 Earnest Money deposit to you and pay an additional $15,000 non-
refundable Earnest Money for an additional 60 day extension. September 6, 1990 will be the 
120th day since our Agreement was signed on May 9th." 
The letter then describes purported difficulties which Overland claimed to be experiencing in 
connection with the development, and which meant that Overland was not prepared to close 
within the first 120 days, and then continues: 
"I would therefore request that our Agreement be extended for an additional 120 days for no 
additional Earnest Money deposit. If this is acceptable I will authorize Mr. Turner to hold 
my deposit until the rezoning has been approved at which time I will then authorize in 
writing its release to you. 
In my original letter to you dated April 6, 1990,1 indicated that Overland Development 
Company would enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with you to develop the property. 
The purpose of this Agreement was not to get you involved in our development but merely 
as a way of permitting Overland to represent that it was also an owner of the property for 
purposes of getting the property rezoned and for financing the restaurant and hotel 
developments. At this stage you have signed a letter to the City indicating that I can 
represent you in getting the property rezoned. There is no need to enter into a Joint Venture 
Agreement until we have rezoned the property and are preparing to get a construction loan 
on the hotel and/or restaurant(s). At that time it will be necessary to prepare the Joint 
Venture Agreement to obtain the financing and pay you for the land." 
(A copy of the entire text of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit C) 
The first quoted paragraph above is an exquisitely clear and concise a statement of what the 
Brunettis contend was the agreement of the parties. Nowhere therein does Overland state that the 
agreement was to be a real joint venture as Overland in bad faith now asserts. In the last quoted 
paragraph, Overland and Holman reiterate that the "joint venture" referred to in the April 6, 1990 
letter/offer is not intended to be a real joint venture since it is "not to get you involved in our 
development but merely a way of permitting Overland to represent that it was also an owner of 
the property for purposes of getting the property rezoned and for financing ...." Also very 
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importantly, Overland admits that the Brunettis as of that date ~ August 25, 1990 ~ had not even 
been required to sign the sham "joint venture," and would not be required to do so until after 
rezoning. By Overland's own admission, the Brunettis were not in breach of the purchase 
agreement in any way as of the date of this letter, nor at any time before Overland unilaterally 
repudiated the agreement within days thereafter. 
Finally, this letter is clearly an admission that Overland was not able to close within the 
first 120 days, such that more time to close was "needed" and "required." Overland expressly 
asked for an extension of time to close - admittedly in conjunction with a request that the terms 
of the agreement be modified — but this letter nevertheless constituted a request for more time, 
just as Judge Peuler ruled. 
Incredibly, Overland again demonstrates a tremendous lack of candor toward this Court 
by failing to quote in the body of its brief the language of the August 25, 1990 letter explaining 
that the "joint venture" was really just a sham to allow Overland to misrepresent to potential 
lenders that it had partial ownership in the property. (See Overland's Brief, pp. 11-12) 
11. The Brunettis declined Overland's request to modify the agreement, and sent a 
letter demanding performance under the agreement. R. 598. (A copy of this letter is attached 
hereto as Exhibit D). 
12. Holman, on behalf of Overland, and getting desperate, met with Turner and the 
two of them decided to meet with Joseph Brunetti and try and talk him into modifying the 
agreement to include a purchase of both the Eastern and Western Parcels. Turner and Holman 
met with Mr. Brunetti at his motel on North Temple, made their pitch, but Mr. Brunetti refused — 
stating that if Overland could not perform on the prior agreement, how could Mr. Brunetti 
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reasonably expect that they could perform on the new proposal. R. 997, pp. 261-271 
13. Despite knowing that Mr. Brunetti had flatly rejected this proposal, Holman, on 
behalf of Overland, wrote a letter to the Brunettis dated September 14, 1990, in which he claimed 
that Mr. Brunetti had agreed to a modification. R. 997, pp. 261-271. 
14. Overland asked Turner to return to it the $15,000 earnest money check. Despite 
the fact that Turner knew that the Brunettis — his clients — claimed that the money represented 
by that check was owed to them, Turner returned the check to Overland. R. 174. 
15. Thereafter, Overland and Turner have maintained in bad faith that either there was 
no unconditional agreement to purchase the property by Overland, or that the Brunettis breached 
the agreement by refusing to enter into the joint venture, or that there never was any request for 
an extension of time to close, etc. R. 562-599 This has forced the Brunettis to retain counsel and 
pursue this litigation to vindicate their rights under the agreement. The retention of counsel and 
the bringing of this litigation was a foreseeable result of the bad faith actions of Overland and 
Turner. 
16. In support of its motion to dismiss the Brunettis' alter ego claims against Holman, 
Overland presented corporate records and tax returns to the trial court which disclosed that 
Overland was newly formed in the Spring of 1990, and that it did not have any appreciable assets 
or activities that year or before. R. 270-317 
17. During discovery, Holman testified at his deposition that Overland was newly 
formed at the time the purchase agreement was entered into, that it had no appreciable assets, that 
it did not have enough cash to fund the first $15,000 nonrefundable earnest money without 
borrowing the same, that he knew that it could not fulfill its obligations to purchase the Eastern 
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Parcel without arranging for a financial partner, and that at the time that he entered into the 
agreement on behalf of Overland, Overland did not have such a partner in mind. R. 337-339 
18. These facts were raised and argued in connection with the summary judgment 
motions. R. 337-339 
19. At or shortly after the commencement of trial, the Brunettis moved to amend their 
pleadings to allege additional instances of fraud uncovered in the foregoing testimony which had 
previously been submitted to the Court and argued in connection with the motions for summary 
judgment. This and other related motions were denied. R. 544-551 
20. After trial, Overland moved for reconsideration and/or summary judgment on the 
issue of whether or not the Brunettis were entitled to recover judgment for the two $15,000 
earnest monies. Overland argued that the August 25, 1991 letter did not constitute a request for 
an extension of time to close, that Overland's obligation to close was conditioned upon the 
Brunettis' entering into the "joint venture" and upon a construction loan being obtained. R. 605-
606 
21. The Brunettis opposed the motion for reconsideration and/or summary judgment 
by arguing in part that: 
"3. The purported 'joint venture' was merely a sham: language which the 
defendants improperly failed to cite to the Court from the agreement makes it clear that an 
actual joint venture was never intended (rather, the Brunettis were to be paid in full at the 
closing of the purchase) 
a. As a sham, the purported sham joint venture was illegal and 
unenforceable as against the Brunettis. 
b. Even if there had been a requirement for a 'joint venture', and even if 
such a requirement were not illegal and therefore unenforceable as against the Brunettis, the 
defendants never asked the Brunettis to enter into the sham joint venture, never drafted the 
sham joint venture agreement, and in their August 25, 1990 letter to the Brunettis stated that 
the sham joint venture was then not yet required — and would not be required until 'after 
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rezoning'; so the 'joint venture requirement' was indefinitely waived by Overland. 
c. Holman admitted that the Brunettis never told him that they would not 
enter into the sham joint venture agreement. 
4. Further, the August 25, 1990 letter also clearly demonstrated that the defendants 
wanted to continue to work to develop the Brunettis' property and were asking for an 
additional 120 days to complete the purchase (albeit without paying any further earnest 
monies)." R.645-646. 
The memorandum thereafter, in part, explained why what Overland proposed to do via the sham 
joint venture was a violation of Utah criminal law and that if the Court were to allow Overland to 
escape its obligations based thereon the Court would be rewarding criminal behavior. R. 652-
654 
(The Brunettis' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, R. 644-
665 addresses most of the arguments raised by Overland in this appeal, and is incorporated 
herein by reference in opposition to Overland's appeal.) 
22. Judge Peuler heard argument from the parties on these issues, and affirmed the 
summary judgment and denied the motion for reconsideration without describing her reasons 
therefor. R. 678 (This Court is free to consider any of the arguments made to support that 
decision, or even other arguments not made which support Judge Peuler's decision, and to 
affirm it based thereon.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There were no material issues of fact with respect to Overland's breach of the agreement. 
Contrary to Overland's assertions, the agreement was clear and unambiguous. Overland agreed 
to buy the property for $895,000 -- plain and simple. There were no contingencies whatsoever. 
The agreement does not say, for example, that "if acceptable zoning is not received, Overland 
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does not have to purchase the property," or, "if a construction loan is not obtained, Overland 
does not have to purchase the property." Why? Because Overland's purchase of the property 
was not contingent upon these or any other conditions precedent. Any experienced real estate 
attorney asked to review the agreement to determine if it contained any contingencies would be 
forced to conclude that there were absolutely no "outs" in that agreement. 
Consequently, if Overland was not prepared to close on the purchase within the first 120 
day time period, such that Overland literally "needed" or "required" additional time to fulfil its 
unconditional obligation to purchase the property, Overland was required to acquiesce in the 
release of the first $15,000 earnest money to the Brunettis and to place "an additional $15,000 
nonrefundable earnest money" in trust. Why did Overland, in its initial April 6, 1990 letter/offer, 
use the phrase "an additional $15,000 nonrefundable earnest money" if the first $15,000 
earnest money was not intended to be "nonrefundable" also? Of course the first $15,000 was 
intended to be nonrefundable. Of course the first $15,000 earnest money was required to be 
released/paid to the Brunettis if the sale had not yet closed by the expiration of the first 120 day 
time period. 
Overland understood this full well as evidenced by Holman's August 25, 1990 letter to 
the Brunettis. The first paragraph of Overland's letter articulates perfectly the Brunettis' 
construction of the agreement. (See Exhibit C) Then, after Overland and Holman spend several 
paragraphs "whining" about how much trouble Overland has allegedly experienced in trying to 
develop the property, Overland, in the first and second full paragraphs on the second page of that 
letter, states that: 
"With so many issues still unanswered I do not intend to permit Mr. Turner to 
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release my $15,000 check until these issues are resolved and the property is rezoned. 
Otherwise I could be left with a property that is improperly zoned for my purposes." 
I would therefore request that our Agreement be extended for an additional 120 days 
for no additional Earnest Money deposit...." 
It is extremely telling that in this language Overland declares that it "does not want to" 
pay the required earnest monies, rather than claiming that it "is not required to" pay them due to 
some condition precedent which had gone unfulfilled. Overland earnestly importunes the 
Brunettis to agree to change the agreement. Why did Overland plead with the Brunettis to allow 
it to continue to work on developing the property without having to release the first $15,000 
earnest money or to deposit a second $15,000 nonrefundable earnest money? Because absent 
such an agreement by the Brunettis, the original terms of the agreement would stand - and 
Overland would be in default if it did not comply. 
It is also extremely telling that in this same letter, Overland did not claim that the 
Brunettis had breached the agreement by failing to enter in to the "joint venture," like Overland 
now so shrilly asserts. Rather, Overland expressly stated that the Brunettis were then not yet 
required to execute the purported "joint venture" agreement. This admission at the exact 
moment of truth - just a few days before the expiration of the first 120 day time period to close -
- should put an absolute end to Overland's false and bad faith claim that the Brunettis breached 
the agreement by refusing to enter the "joint venture." Overland's claims in this regard are a 
recent fabrication by Overland and its counsel. 
The claim that the parties did not have a "meeting of the minds" because the Brunettis 
testified at their deposition and at trial that they never intended to "enter into a joint venture," is 
similarly feckless. Neither the Brunettis nor Overland ever contemplated that the "joint venture" 
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referred to in the purchase agreement would be a "real" joint venture -- nor that the Brunettis 
would be required to actually contribute their property to some sort of partnership. Rather, 
Overland expressly assured the Brunettis that there would be a separate agreement requiring that 
the property be paid for in cash at closing and that the "joint venture" was not meant to be a real 
joint venture (i.e. -- one that involved the Brunettis in the development), but merely a sham joint 
venture to permit Overland and Holman to falsely represent to prospective lenders that the 
property had been contributed to a partnership, when in fact it had not. Being elderly and 
relatively unsophisticated, the Brunettis did not understand that what Overland intended to do 
was illegal and criminal. So, they naively agreed to enter into this non-joint venture, so long as 
they were paid in cash for their property at closing. As such, there was a "meeting of the minds" 
as to this non-joint venture issue. Overland's arguments to the contrary are again disingenuous 
and made in bad faith — and support the Brunettis' claim that Overland has breached its 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing and should be required to pay the Brunettis' attorney's 
fees herein as additional consequential damages. 
When Overland refused to either close on the property or pay the two $15,000 
nonrefundable earnest money deposits, what remedies were available to the Brunettis for this 
breach of contract? The Brunettis elected to sue for the two $15,000 nonrefundable earnest 
monies — which from the agreement the Court could reasonably and correctly determine were 
what the parties felt constituted liquidated damages. Why would Overland in its April 6, 1990 
letter/offer refer to the second $15,000 earnest money deposit as "nonrefundable" if Overland did 
not understand and agree that this second $15,000 was to be given to the Brunettis if Overland 
failed to close on the purchase after the expiration of the last 60 day time period? Overland's 
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arguments in this regard are again nonsensical and disingenuous. "Nonrefundable" is not an 
ambiguous concept. 
The Brunettis' alternative theory of quantum meruit alleged that the two $15,000 
nonrefundable earnest monies represented the value of the right that Overland obtained to 
exclusively pursue development of the Brunettis' property for six months (180 days), and that 
Overland would be unjustly enriched at the Brunettis' expense if it were allowed to retain said 
benefit without paying the Brunettis therefor. If the Court reverses Judge Peuler, the Brunettis 
must be allowed to pursue this alternative theory of relief on remand. Alternatively, this Court 
can rule that the theory of quantum meruit also justifies the judgment which Judge Peuler granted 
to the Brunettis for the two $15,000 nonrefundable earnest monies. 
The relief granted by Judge Peuler to the Brunettis due to Overland's admitted failure to 
either purchase the Eastern Parcel or to pay either of the two $15,000 nonrefundable earnest 
monies was not only mandated by the clear and unambiguous language of the agreement, but any 
ambiguities were resolved by Judge Peuler after hearing full testimony at the trial and then 
affirming the judgment when Judge Peuler denied Overland's motion for reconsideration. These 
matters have already been tried, and Overland has not even attempted to make any showing that 
there was not sufficient evidence at trial to support Judge Peuler's decision after trial to affirm 
the summary judgment. 
Cross-Appeal Arguments 
Fraud — Overland/Holman —The issues of whether it was fraud for Overland to 
represent in the letter/offer that it had developed $30 million in real estate, when Overland was a 
brand new corporation with no prior development experience and no assets; and whether it was 
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fraud to fail to disclose to the Brunettis that Overland had no development experience, had no 
assets, had no money to pay the initial $15,000 nonrefundable earnest money deposit, and had no 
possibility of performing its obligations under the purchase agreement without obtaining a 
financial partner; were raised and actually litigated by the parties in connection with the cross-
motions for summary judgment. It was improper therefore for Judge Peuler to deny the 
Brunettis' motion to amend to conform to the evidence and to refuse to allow the Brunettis to 
litigate these issues at the trial. Judge Peuler's ruling in this regard should be reversed and these 
issues remanded for trial. 
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing — Overland and 
Turner ~ The evidence was without dispute that: (1) Overland never deposited the first $15,000 
nonrefundable earnest money in trust as required by the agreement and that Turner did not 
require them to do so, (2) although Holman did testify at trial that he made some efforts to try 
and develop the Eastern Parcel, sometime in June or July of 1990, Overland and Turner agreed to 
work together to develop both the Eastern and Western Parcels, and started development efforts 
thereon rather than on just the Eastern Parcel as required by the purchase agreement, (3) when 
the Brunettis refused to modify the agreement with respect to the payment of the nonrefundable 
earnest money deposits, Overland and Turner boldly approached the Brunettis with a proposal 
that the agreement be modified to include the purchase and development of both the Eastern and 
Western Parcels (and allow Overland to escape its obligation to pay the two required $15,000 
nonrefundable earnest monies), (4) when the Brunettis refused, Overland wrote a letter to the 
Brunettis brazenly thanking the Brunettis for modifying the agreement despite the fact that no 
such agreement had been reached, (5) despite having no justification for doing so, Overland 
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asked Turner to return the first $15,000 earnest money check, which Turner did return, and (6) 
Overland and Turner falsely and in bad faith claimed thereafter that there were conditions 
precedent to Overland's obligation to close on the purchase of the Eastern Parcel and that the 
Brunettis breached the agreement by refusing to enter into the "joint venture" referred to in the 
agreement. With these facts not in dispute after the trial, it was an abuse of discretion for Judge 
Peuler to fail to find that Overland and Turner breached the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. This Court should grant the Brunettis summary judgment on this claim and direct 
that the Brunettis be awarded their attorney's fees as consequential damages arising from this 
failure to act in good faith. 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty — Turner — Upon the same undisputed facts found at trial set 
forth in the previous section, it was an abuse of discretion for Judge Peuler to fail to find that 
Turner breached his fiduciary duty as the Brunettis' real estate agent. This Court should grant 
the Brunettis summary judgment on this issue and remand the matter to Judge Peuler to 
determine damages. 
ARGUMENT 
I. With Respect to the Judgment Against Overland For the Two $15.000 Nonrefundable 
Earnest Money Deposits, the Essential Facts Are Not in Dispute and the Agreement was 
Clear and Unambiguous 
A. The Essential Facts, Both at the Time of the Granting of the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, and After Trial When the Court Affirmed the 
Summary Judgment After Considering the Evidence, Were and Are Not in 
Dispute 
The following facts were not in dispute at the time that Judge Peuler heard arguments on 
the Brunettis' motion for partial summary judgment on the contract claim as to the following 
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matters: 
That Overland sent an offer to the Brunettis embodied in the April 6, 1990 letter 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Overland's Brief, p. 7, par. 3 
That, after negotiation, the offer was modified by the Addendum/Counteroffer set 
forth in Exhibit B. Overland's Brief, p. 10, par. 10 
That Overland sent the Brunettis the August 25,1990 letter attached hereto as 
Exhibit C. Overland's Brief, p. 11, par. 13 
That the Brunettis rejected the request to modify the agreement which Overland 
made in the August 25, 1990 letter, in the letter attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
Overland's Brief, p. 12, par. 14 
That Overland did not close on the purchase of the Eastern Parcel. Overland's 
Brief, p. 13, par. 17 
That Overland did not pay the Brunettis either of the two $15,000 nonrefundable 
earnest monies referred to in Exhibits A and B, which exhibits form the agreement 
of the parties. Overland's Brief, p. 13, par. 17 
These factual matters were not disputed by any testimony adduced at the trial, nor are they 
disputed at this time. 
B. If The Parties Agreement Was Clear and Unambiguous, No Parol Evidence 
Is Allowed to Contradict the Clear Meaning and Intent of the Agreement 
If the parties' agreement embodied in the Overland letter/offer in Exhibit A, as modified 
by the Addendum/Counteroffer in Exhibit B, is clear and unambiguous, no parol evidence is 
allowed on the issue of what the terms of the parties' agreement were. Hall v. Process 
Instruments and Control. Inc.. 866 P. 2d 604 (Utah App. 1993), aff d 890 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1995) 
Whether the agreement is clear and unambiguous is determined by the trial judge. If the trial 
judge determines that the agreement is clear and unambiguous, the trial judge can construe the 
agreement and grant such relief as that construction, in light of the other undisputed facts, 
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warrants. Id. 
At the time that Judge Peuler considered the cross-motions for summary judgment, she 
ruled that the parties' agreement was clear and unambiguous, and that based upon her 
construction of the language of that agreement, and in light of the foregoing undisputed facts, the 
Brunettis are entitled to judgment in the form of the sum of the two $15,000 nonrefundable 
earnest money deposits. R. 423 After trial at which evidence was heard as to the nature of the 
parties' agreement, and the parties' conduct in fulfilling or not fulfilling said agreement, Judge 
Peuler reaffirmed her prior ruling. R. 678 This Court's review of the parties' agreement should 
lead it to conclude that Judge Peuler was correct in her rulings as a matter of law. Even if this 
Court determines that there might have been some ambiguities, Judge Peuler, as the trier of fact, 
heard evidence on these matters at trial and affirmed the judgment in light thereof. This Court 
cannot reverse the denial of the motion to reconsider, and the confirmation of the earlier 
summary judgment in favor of the Brunettis, without finding that Judge Peuler did not hear 
sufficient evidence at trial upon which she could reasonably conclude that her prior rulings were 
correct. 
C. The Agreement Required Overland to do That Which It Did Not 
Do — Either Purchase the Property or Pay the Two $15,000 Nonrefundable 
Earnest Money Deposits to the Brunettis 
1. The Agreement Was An Unconditional Agreement to Purchase 
The Eastern Parcel — There Were No Contingencies or Legal 
Excuses for Overland to Fail to Perform 
a. There were no conditions precedent to Overland's 
obligation to purchase the property 
The language of the agreement contains no contingencies or "outs." The agreement says 
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that Overland will purchase the property for $895,000 within 120 days, or, if "needed" or 
"required", within an extra 60 days. R. 117 The agreement states that Overland will take certain 
steps to further its development and purchase of the property (such as rezoning, environmental 
investigations, etc.)(See Exhibit A), but under no stretch of the imagination does it state that if 
any of these steps or not successfully completed, Overland is excused from its obligation to 
purchase the property. The agreement refers to a construction loan, but only in the context of 
clarifying that the proposed "joint venture" was not to be a real joint venture, but a sham, or non-
joint venture, and to assure the Brunettis that they will be paid in full for their property at the 
closing. This language referring to a construction loan cannot logically be construed to provide 
that Overland is not required to purchase the property if a construction loan is not obtained. 
Overland, of course, attempts to find contingencies in every nook and cranny of the 
agreement, but its arguments strain logic to the breaking point. An example of Overland's wild 
and totally illogical arguments is found in Overland's assertion that: "The Brunettis were to be 
involved in developing the Property to the extent they would contribute the land up front in 
exchange for a payment if a construction loan was obtained by Overland." (Overland's Brief, p. 
29) Does Overland seriously expect this Court to believe that the Brunettis agreed to give 
Overland an interest in their property up front, but that Overland would not have to pay the 
Brunettis anything for that interest unless Overland was successful in obtaining a construction 
loan? This illogical construction would allow Overland to obtain an interest in the Brunettis' 
property with the possibility of never having to pay the Brunettis anything for that interest. This 
argument is not only belied by the clear language of the agreement (i.e., that the joint venture 
was for appearance and misrepresentation-to-proposed-lenders purposes only, and that the 
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Brunettis would unconditionally be paid for their property at closing), but is ludicrous. 
Nevertheless, Overland makes this argument, and the other disingenuous arguments in its brief, 
in support of its appeal. 
After the trial, Judge Peuler was well within her rights as the trier of fact to compare 
Overland's protestations that there were contigencies with the language of not only the 
agreement, but also the August 25, 1990 Overland letter to the Brunettis, as well as the Brunettis' 
testimony as to what they understood the agreements to provide, and to resolve any factual issues 
in favor of the Brunettis' and her prior construction of the agreement. This she did, and she 
cannot be reversed unless this Court finds that her weighing of the facts, after trial in connection 
with the motion for reconsideration/summary judgment, was an abuse of discretion and/or that 
the facts at trial were insufficient to support her ruling such that it was clearly erroneous. Stewart 
v. State Bv and Through Deland. 830 P. 2d 306 (Utah App. 1992) The summary judgment, 
either as a matter of law, or after Judge Peuler heard the evidence and resolved the factual issues 
in the Brunettis' favor, was legally correct and not factually clearly erroneous and should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
b. Overland's "joint venture" arguments are without 
merit 
(i) The agreement is clear and unambiguous 
as to what was intended by the "joint venture" 
As indicated in the factual statement and summary of argument sections above, 
Overland's April 6, 1990 letter/offer (See Exhibit A) makes it clear, when one reviews the 
portions of the agreement that Overland failed to quote to this Court in the body of its brief, that 
the proposed "joint venture" was not to be a real joint venture because its purpose was to allow 
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Overland to misrepresent to lenders that it had an equity interest in the Brunettis' land, when in 
fact, pursuant to the "separate agreement" required by the agreement, Overland was 
unconditionally required to purchase and pay for the property at closing. This Court should 
consider sanctioning Overland and its counsel for the serious lack of candor displayed by its 
failure to quote in the body of its brief those portions of the agreement that make it crystal clear 
that the proposed "joint venture" was not intended to be a real joint venture, but rather a sham, or 
non-joint venture. Overland engaged in the same lack of candor in its memorandum in support 
of its motion for reconsideration/summary judgment. R. 644-665 
(ii) The August 25,1990 letter from Holman 
to the Brunettis is clear and unambiguous 
as to what was intended by the "joint venture" 
The August 25, 1990 Overland letter to the Brunettis again assured the Brunettis that 
"[t]he purpose of this [joint venture] Agreement was not to get you involved in our development 
but merely as a way of permitting Overland to represent that it was also an owner of the property 
for ... financing the restaurant and hotel developments." See Exhibit C. The proposed "joint 
venture" was clearly not intended to be a real joint venture which "involved [the Brunettis] in 
[Overland's] development. Rather, it was "merely .. a way of permitting Overland to 
[misrepresent that it was also an owner of the property ... [to prospective lenders]." 
(iii) The August 25,1990 letter is a clear admission 
that the Brunettis had not violated the "joint 
venture" provision of the agreement and 
that those provisions had as of that point in time 
been indefinitely waived by Overland 
The August 25, 1990 Overland letter continues on with respect to the proposed "joint 
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venture" stating: "At this stage you have signed a letter to the City indicating that I can represent 
you in getting the property rezoned. There is no need to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement 
until we have rezoned the property and are preparing to get a construction loan on the hotel 
and/or restaurant...." (Exhibit C) This is an unequivocal admission that the Brunettis had 
fulfilled their obligations with respect to the "joint venture" as of August 25, 1990, and that the 
Brunettis were not required to do anything further in that regard until after Overland rezoned the 
property. This latter part constitutes an indefinite waiver of the "joint venture" requirements of 
the agreement. In light of these admissions and this clear waiver, it is incredible that Overland 
has the temerity to continue to argue in this appeal that the Brunettis breached the "joint venture" 
requirements of the agreement. 
Judge Peuler was correct originally when she rejected at summary judgment Overland's 
then nascent argument that the "joint venture" portions of the agreement provided Overland with 
a possible excuse for failing to close on the purchase of the property and failing to pay either of 
the two $15,000 nonrefundable earnest monies. But, after the trial, the evidentiary admission 
found in this August 25, 1990 letter is unquestionably sufficient to support Judge Peuler's 
decision to affirm the granting of the prior summary judgment and to reject Overland's feckless 
"joint venture"-related arguments. 
(iv) Even if the Brunettis had violated the "joint 
venture" provisions of the agreement, those 
provisions are illegal and unenforceable and 
cannot be interposed by Overland to defeat 
its obligations otherwise under the agreement 
Holman testified at trial at length about his extensive experience as a real estate 
developer. R. 997, p. 305 Prior to proposing the transaction to the Brunettis in the April 6, 1990 
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letter/offer, Holman and Overland apparently became aware that lenders would not loan 100% of 
the monies necessary to purchase land and to build improvements thereon. Holman/Overland 
knew that lenders almost always required developers to demonstrate that they have "equity" in 
any proposed development project. This "equity" often takes the form of actual cash 
contributions toward the development of the project (sometimes required to be paid into escrow 
prior to closing, or to be demonstrated by bank deposits) to pay for the required portion (often 
20% to 30%) of the total land purchase and construction costs. However a developer can often 
avoid demonstrating or paying additional cash (above and beyond the proposed loan proceeds) 
toward a project's costs if the developer can show that it has already paid for or otherwise 
acquired (i.e. through a partner's contribution of) the land for the proposed development. If a 
developer can make such a showing of equity/land contribution, the developer can claim that he 
is not seeking to use any portion of the construction loan proceeds to purchase the land for the 
development. 
Holman and Overland testified that they had no cash to contribute to the project (they did 
not even have enough cash to pay the two $15,000 nonrefundable earnest money deposits). R. 
337-368 So, to get around the lenders' "equity" requirements, Holman and Overland asked the 
Brunettis to agree to make it look like the property had been "contributed" to the development by 
entering into a sham joint venture agreement. (Exhibit A) It was unquestionably a sham because 
there was going to be a separate, under-the-table, agreement requiring Overland to pay cash for 
the property at closing. But, Overland would be able to submit the phony joint venture 
agreement to the prospective lenders an falsely claim that Overland was not going to use any of 
the construction loan proceeds to purchase the land. 
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Not only would this constitute civil fraud upon any lending institution that agreed to loan 
monies to Overland based upon such falsehoods, but it would constitute theft under Utah's 
criminal code found at U.C.A. 76-6-401 et seq. (a second degree felony). Any written loan 
application which failed to disclose the secret agreement to pay the Brunettis in full at closing 
could constitute a "written false statement" under U.C.A. 76-8-504 (See copies of these code 
sections attached hereto as Exhibit E). 
Since the proposed sham joint venture would be illegal if carried out, even if the 
Overland had not waived this requirement of the agreement in the August 25, 1990 letter, 
Overland is legally estopped from asserting the Brunettis' purported failure to go through with 
this illegal scheme as a defense to the Brunettis' contract claim. For this Court to hold otherwise 
would in effect reward Holman and Overland for their illegal and criminal activities and violate 
public policy. 
The Brunettis made the foregoing argument to Judge Peuler after the trial in connection 
with Overland's motion for reconsideration/summary judgment. R. 652-654. Judge Peuler's 
affirmation of the summary judgment, and rejection of Overland's "joint venture" related 
challenges, was correct and not clearly erroneous and should be affirmed for these same reasons. 
2. The Agreement Required Overland to Pay the Two $15,000 
Nonrefundable Earnest Money Deposits to the Brunettis If 
Overland Did Not Purchase the Eastern Parcel Within the 
Specified Time Periods 
a. Since the obligation to purchase the Eastern Parcel 
was unconditional, the words "needed" and "required" 
in the letter/offer and the Addendum/Counteroffer do 
not mean "request" or "desire", but are literal 
Once the conclusion is reached that the parties' agreement constituted an unconditional 
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agreement by Overland to purchase the Eastern Parcel, it becomes obvious that the words 
"needed" (in the April 6, 1990 letter/offer) and "required" (in the Addendum/Counteroffer) do 
not mean "request" as urged by Overland. "Request" would only make sense of Overland had 
the right to determine that it no longer wished to pursue the purchase of the Brunettis' property. 
While the agreement would permit Overland to cease development efforts, it does not allow 
Overland to determine that it no longer desires to purchase the property with impunity. 
Since the obligation to purchase the property was unconditional, the concept of 
"need[ing]" or "requir[ing]" more time to close on that purchase makes sense ~ if for any reason 
Overland cannot or does not close on the purchase of the property within the first 120 days, such 
that it literally "needs" or "requires" more time to close, it must release the first $15,000 
nonrefundable earnest money deposit and deposit a second $15,000 nonrefundable earnest 
money deposit in trust. If Overland does so, it will not at that point in time be in default under 
the agreement for failing to close on the purchase of the property. 
b. If Overland did not close on the purchase of the Eastern 
Parcel within the first 120 time period, regardless of the 
reason, such that it literally "needed" or 
"required" additional time to fulfil its obligations to 
close the purchase of the Eastern Parcel, the Agreement 
required Overland to release the first $15,000 
nonrefundable earnest money deposit, and place "an 
additional $15,000 nonrefundable earnest money 
deposit in trust 
Overland argues that since it decided not to pursue the purchase of the Eastern Parcel 
from the Brunettis prior to the expiration of the initial 120-day time period to close, Overland 
somehow was no longer required to pay the first $15,000 nonrefundable earnest money to the 
Brunettis, and was also not required to pay into trust the second $15,000 nonrefundable earnest 
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money. This is illogical. Overland's argument suggests that if Overland breached its agreement 
to purchase the property through repudiation before the expiration of the first 120 days, somehow 
this breach relieves Overland of its remaining obligations under the agreement. This argument is 
contrary to the unambiguous language of the agreement which provides that if Overland is not 
able to close on the purchase of the property within 120 days, such that it literally needs 
additional time to fulfill its obligations to purchase the property, Overland must release the first 
$15,000 nonrefundable earnest money deposit to the Brunettis, and must deposit the second 
$15,000 nonrefundable earnest money deposit in trust. 
Overland similarly cannot get out of these obligations simply by failing to "request" 
additional time to close. Nowhere in the agreement does it state that if Overland does not 
"request" additional time to close, it does not have to close on the property and does not have to 
pay the two nonrefundable earnest monies (though, as argued above and as found by Judge 
Peuler, Overland did communicate to the Brunettis its desire to continue the project and 
Overland did request more time to close. (See the August 25,1990 letter, Exhibit C) 
That the first $15,000 earnest money was intended to be nonrefundable and payable to the 
Brunettis at the end of the initial 120 day time period to close is also found in the language of 
Overland's April 6, 1990 letter/offer (Exhibit A) when it refers to the second $15,000 earnest 
money deposit as "an additional $15,000 nonrefundable earnest money." The word "additional" 
modifies the entire phrase "$15,000 nonrefundable earnest money," not just the "$15,000" 
portion thereof As such, the agreement makes it clear that the first $15,000 earnest money was 
also to be nonrefundable and payable to the Brunettis without any conditions upon the expiration 
of the first 120 days if the purchase had not yet closed. 
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c. If Overland still did not close on the purchase of the 
Eastern parcel within the remaining 60 day time period, 
the second $15,000 nonrefundable earnest money was 
to be released to the Brunettis — because it was 
"nonrefundable" 
Overland admits that it did not close on the purchase of the Eastern Parcel, and that it did 
not pay the Brunettis either of the two $15,000 nonrefundable earnest monies. Overland attempts 
to excuse this failure by again arguing that unless Overland "requested" additional time to close 
the purchase, Overland was not required to deposit the second "15,000 nonrefundable earnest 
money." For the reasons set forth in the previous section, this argument is without merit. Judge 
Peuler correctly found that if Overland did not close on the purchase of the property within the 
first 120 days, the obligation to release the first $15,000 nonrefundable deposit to the Brunettis, 
and to deposit the second $15,000 nonrefundable earnest money into trust, was triggered. 
Since Overland did not close on the purchase of the property within the second 60 day 
time period, Overland was required to deliver the second $15,000 nonrefundable earnest money 
to the Brunettis. The concept of "nonrefundable" with respect to this second $15,000 earnest 
money deposit is not ambiguous. "Nonrefundable" means that if there is no closing, the funds 
are to be paid to the seller and not back to the buyer. Judge Peuler was correct when she 
determined that the second $15,000 nonrefundable deposit became due and payable to the 
Brunettis at the expiration of the second 60 day time period, or on or before November 7, 1990, 
and the judgment in favor of the Brunettis for both the $15,000 earnest monies which were not 
paid to them should be affirmed. 
For the foregoing reasons, Overland's appeal should be rejected and Judge Peuler's 
granting of judgment to the Brunettis for the sum of the two $15,000 nonrefundable earnest 
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monies should be affirmed. 
II. The Brunettis' Cross-Appeal 
A. Under URCP, Rule 15(b), Judge Peuler Was Required to Allow An 
Amendment of the Pleadings to Include Issues Which Had Been Tried 
By Express or Implied Consent of the Parties 
URCP, Rule 15(b), relating to amendments to conform to the evidence, provides that: 
"When issues not raised in the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence 
and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after 
judgment." 
If the issues of fraud which the Brunettis sought to litigate at trial had been previously tried by 
the express or implied consent of the parties in connection with the earlier motions for summary 
judgment, the foregoing rule required that Judge Peuler treat them "in all respects as if they had 
been raised in the pleadings." 
1. The Issues of Fraud Which the Brunettis Sought to Raise 
Had Been Litigated In Connection With the Motions for 
Summary Judgment 
The issues of whether it was fraud for Overland to represent in the April 6, 1990 
letter/offer (Exhibit A) that it had developed $30 million in real estate, when Overland was a 
brand new corporation with no prior development experience and no assets; and whether it was 
fraud to fail to disclose to the Brunettis that Overland had no development experience, had no 
assets, had no money to pay the initial $15,000 nonrefundable earnest money deposit, and had no 
possibility of performing its obligations under the purchase agreement without obtaining a 
financial partner; were raised and actually litigated by the parties in connection with the cross-
motions for summary judgment. R. 337-339 
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The Brunettis made a formal motion to amend to conform to this evidence, but Judge 
Peuler denied the same and refused to allow the Brunettis to pursue said issues at trial. R. 554-
551 This ruling was incorrect as a matter of law and should be reversed and these issues 
remanded for trial. 
2. The Issues of Fraud Were Also Litigated In Connection With 
Other Matters During the Course of the Trial 
In connection with other issues, the facts which supported these additional allegations of 
fraud were introduced at trial, and the Brunettis made additional motions to amend to conform to 
this evidence. R. 231-237 Again, Judge Peuler denied these motions, which denial was incorrect 
as a matter of law and should be reversed. 
B. Substantial Evidence of Overland's Breach of the Implied Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Was Without Dispute and Sufficient 
That It Was Clearly Erroneous for Judge Peuler to Find That There 
Was no Such Breach 
The evidence at trial was without dispute that: (1) Overland never deposited the first 
$15,000 nonrefundable earnest money in trust as required by the agreement and that Turner did 
not require them to do so, R. 173 and 594, Overland's Brief, p. 10, par. 11 (2) although 
Holman did testify at trial that he made some efforts to try and develop the Eastern Parcel, 
sometime in June or July of 1990, Overland and Turner agreed to work together to develop both 
the Eastern and Western Parcels, and started development efforts thereon rather than on just the 
Eastern Parcel as required by the purchase agreement, R. 996, pp. 139-140 and 185-186 (3) 
when the Brunettis refused to modify the agreement with respect to the payment of the 
nonrefundable earnest money deposits, Overland and Turner boldly approached the Brunettis 
with a proposal that the agreement be modified to include the purchase and development of both 
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the Eastern and Western Parcels (and to allow Overland to escape its obligation to pay the two 
required $15,000 nonrefundable earnest monies), R. 997, pp. 261-271 (4) when the Brunettis 
refused, Overland wrote a letter to the Brunettis brazenly thanking the Brunettis for modifying 
the agreement despite the fact that no such agreement had been reached, R. 997, pp. 261-271 (5) 
despite having no justification for doing so, Overland asked Turner to return the first $15,000 
earnest money check, which Turner did return, R. 174 and (6) Overland and Turner have falsely 
and in bad faith claimed that there were conditions precedent to Overland's obligation to close on 
the purchase of the Eastern Parcel and that the Brunettis breached the agreement by refusing to 
enter into the "joint venture" referred to in the agreement. R. 562-599 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires parties to act in good faith to 
effectuate the terms of the contract. Olympus Hills Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food and Drug 
Centers, Inc.. 889 P. 2d 445, 450-451 (Utah App. 1994) With these facts not in dispute after the 
trial, it was clearly erroneous for Judge Peuler to fail to find that Overland and Turner breached 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This Court should grant the Brunettis 
summary judgment on this claim and direct that the Brunettis be awarded their attorney's fees as 
consequential damages arising from this failure to act in good faith. 
C. Substantial Evidence of Turner's Breach of the Implied Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing Was Without Dispute and Sufficient 
That It Was Clearly Erroneous for Judge Peuler to Find That 
There Was no Such Breach by Turner 
For the reasons set forth in the previous section, it was clearly erroneous for Judge Peuler 
to find that Turner did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This Court 
should grant the Brunettis summary judgment on this claim and direct that the Brunettis be 
40 
awarded damages arising from said breach, including their attorney's fees as consequential 
damages. 
D. The Evidence of Turner's Breach of Fiduciary Duty Was Sufficiently 
Without Dispute That It Was Clearly Erroneous for Judge Peuler 
to Find That There Was no Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Turner 
A real estate agent owes his clients a fiduciary duty to disclose all material facts 
and to act solely in the best interests of his clients. Hopkins v. Wardley Corporation. 611 P. 2d 
1204, 1206 (Utah 1980) For the reasons and based upon the facts set forth in the previous two 
sections, it was clearly erroneous for Judge Peuler to find that Turner did not breach his fiduciary 
duty to the Brunettis. This Court should grant the Brunettis summary judgment on this claim and 
direct that the Brunettis be awarded damages arising from said breach, including their attorney's 
fees as consequential damages. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Brunettis respectfully request that the Court affirm Judge 
Peuler's judgment against Overland for the sum of the two $15,000 nonrefundable earnest 
monies, but, pursuant to the cross-appeal, reverse Judge Peuler's refusal to allow the Brunettis to 
litigate the full breadth of Overland's fraud, reverse Judge Peuler's finding that Overland and 
Turner did not violate their obligation to deal fairly and in good faith with the Brunettis, and to 
reverse Judge Peuler's finding that Turner did not breach his fiduciary duty to the Brunettis. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of October, 1997. 
B^nM. Steffaisen 
Attorney for the Bru: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of October, 1997,1 caused four copies of foregoing 
Brief to be xxx mailed, postage prepaid; addressed to: 
Cohne Rappaport & Segal 
Attn: Richard Rappaport 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
FAX 355-1813 
Gilbert R. Turner 
P.O. Box 1804 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84060 
42 
J53 Overland 
*JBa^ Development Company 
April 6, 1990 
Gil Turner 
Turner Co* Real Estate 
P.O. Box 2264 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Dear Mr. Turner: 
Overland Development Company would like to purchase the 5*33 (+ or •) 
acres, Parcel No. 38019-0000, located on North Temple west o£ Redwood 
Road. The terms o£ the purchase are slightly different from the nonnal 
Earnest Money Agreement that is presented, however, we have found our 
approach to be very sound and profitable for both the landowner and the 
developer. Over the past 6 years we have developed over..$30 million of 
real estate using this method. Our proposal is as follows: 
Overland Development Company would agree to purchase the property for an 
agreed price of $850,000. Included in the purchase price is the 
assignment of the private club license and purchase of the existing 
building, excluding any inventory. A $15,000 earnest money would be 
deposited in an independent trust account to be credited to the purchase 
price at the time of closing with the balance being paid from the 
proceeds of the construction loan. Overland would then enter into a 
joint venture agreement with the landowner, within two weeks, to develop 
the property. It would be Overlandfs responsibility to pay for all the 
development and approval costs, including: a feasibility study; an 
appraisal; environmental studies; engineering drawings; architectural 
drawings; city approvals; and all other costs incident to the development 
of the property for the purpose of building a hotel and restaurant/club. 
The landowner would agree to permit Overland Development Company, or 
another entity to which Overland assigns its interest, to represent to 
the City and to lending institutions that the land lias been contributed 
to the partnership. This enables Overland to establish an equity 
position in the deal to comply with the lending institutions 
requirements. 
Overland, by separate agreement, would agree to pay the landowner the 
agreed upon price, in cash, at the closing of the construction loan. 
The benefit of a joint venture relationship of this type is that it 
enables the developer to use it's limited resources on the development of 
the property instead of the purchase of the land. This also reduces some 
of the risk of the developer and gives assurance that the project can be 
consummated before the expiration of the agreement. 
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£53 Overland 
<#Ife*, Development Company 
August 25, 1990 
Joseph R. Brunetti 
Dear Mr. Brunetti: 
On May 9, 1990 you and your wife, Florence, accepted an offer I made to 
purchase 5 (+ or -) acres located on North Temple near Redwood Road for 
$895,000. The Agreement gave me 120 days to complete the sale. If I 
needed additional time I would be required to release the original 
$15,000 Earnest Money deposit to you and pay an additional $15,000 
non-refundable Earnest Money for an additional 60 day extension. 
September 6, 1990 will be the 120th day since our Agreement was signed on 
May 9th. 
So far I have spent considerable time and money trying to get Salt Lake 
City to rezone the property from R-6 to C-l. Gil Turner and I have met 
with members of the Planning Commission on four separate occasions. Two 
of those meetings have been with the Development Coordination Committee. 
Because the Committee will not rezone a property without a specific 
development project in mind I have had my architect design a conceptual 
site showing two restaurant pads and a hotel. After meeting with the 
Development Coordination Committee for the second time they ask me to 
completely revise the conceptual plan. They wanted wider streets for 
Duder and Gertie. Thev wanted to eliminate any access into the property 
from Redwood Road to Gertie and they wanted Duder to dead end instead of 
tying into New Star Road. Additionally they requested changes in the 
height of buildings and in the parking layout and landscaping schemes. 
Besides the time delays we have experienced in dealing with the City 
there have been some other major issues to resolve. In order to enter 
the property, with the elimination of access from Gertie, we need a left 
hand turn lane to replace the island on North Temple. Although the State 
has expressed a willingness to provide a left hand turn lane into the 
property I will need to have an engineer design the turn lane and submit 
it to the Utah Department of Transportation for approval. 
There are other issues that still need to be addressed before we can 
finalize our Agreement. It is likely that there is soil contamination on 
the east side of your property because of its proximity to the Cash Saver 
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gas station. I need to have a soil test run to determine if this is the 
case. If it is I still intend to buy the property at the agreed price 
but it will require that I move one of the restaurant pad sites and maybe 
redesing the hotel layout. 
V/ith so many issues still unanswered I do not intend to permit Mr, Turner 
to release my $15,000 check until these issues are resolved and the 
property is rezoned. Otherwise I could be left with a property that is 
improperly zoned for my purposes, 
I would therefore request that our Agreement be extended for an 
additional 120 days for no additional Earnest Money deposit^ If this is 
acceptable I will authorize Mr, Turner to hold my deposit until the 
rezoning has been approved at which time I will then authorize in writing 
its release to you. 
I appreciate your patience and apologize for the delay. I can't believe 
how incredibly slow the City is rezoning property. Regardless of the 
City's delays I am moving forward as fast as I can on all the other 
issues. It appears that I have tentatively lined up an additional equity 
partner to joint venture the development of the hotel. I have also 
received verbal approval from Hampton Inn regarding the acquisition of 
the Franchise rights for the location. Mr. Turner and I have also 
secured two very strong national restaurant chains who are now going 
through their review and approval process. 
I apologize for the delay. A lot of the blame rests with the City and 
their inability to move faster on rezoning the property. I believe that 
even if another developer were found to replace me that they would have 
to go through the same process and frustrations of rezoning the property 
before they would agree to buy it. 
In my original letter to you dated April 6, 1990, I indicated that 
Overland Development Company would enter into a Joint Venture Agreement 
with you to develop the property. The purpose of this Agreement was not 
to get you involved in our development but merely as a way of permitting 
Overland to represent that it was also an owner of the property for 
purposes of getting the property rezoned and for financing the restaurant 
and hotel developments. At this stage you have signed a letter to the 
City indicating that I can represent you in getting the property 
rezoned. There is no need to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement until 
we have rezoned the property and are preparing to get a construction loan 
on the hotel and/or restaurant/s. At that time it will be necessary to 
prepare the Joint Venture Agreement to obtain the financing and pay you 
for the land. 
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If you and Mrs- Brunetti agree to provide the extension requested above 
and to permit me to continue forward with the rezoning and construction 
financing as has been outlined above please sign the acceptance below, 
Sincerely,. 
Kenneth T. Holman 
President 
Accepted: 
fyytOi-J 
Joseph R. Brunetti Florence W. Brunetti 
Date Date 
O r ^ p* f\ r*, 
JOSEPH R. BRUNETTI 
1216 WEST 900 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
Gil Turner 
Turner Co. Real Estate 
P.O. Box 2264 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Kenneth T. Holman 
Overland Development Company 
230 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Payment of Earnest Money Fees 
Gentlemen: 
Florence and I have reviewed the April 6, 1990, letter from 
Mr. Holman and the Addendum proposed by us on April 26, 1990, and 
accepted by Mr. Holman on May 7, 1990. These indicate that the 
$15,000 on deposit with Mr. Turner was to be turned over to us if 
Mr. Holman did not buy the property on or before September 4, 1990„ 
Also, Mr. Holman is required to deposit the second $15,000 
nonrefundable payment. We cannot see any conditions on either of 
these payments. So, we do not have to agree to the terms of Mr. 
Holman1 s August 25, 1990, letter. It does not matter why Mr. 
Holman is not ready to buy our property. The agreement simply says 
that if he hasn't done so by September 4, 1990, Mr. Turner must 
turn over the first $15,000 and Mr. Holman must immediately deposit 
a second $15,000 with Mr. Turner. If Mr. Holman then does not buy 
our property within 60 days of September 4, 1990, the second 
$15,000 must be immediately turned over to us and the deal is off. 
Florence and I must insist that the required payments be paid 
on or before Monday, September 10, 1990, or else we will pursue our 
legal rights. 
Please do not call to try and change our minds. We won't 
change our minds, and Florence will not let you talk to me. You 
have tied up our property for the past 4 months. Just pay us the 
money that you agreed to. 
Joseph R. Brunetti 
Yours truly, 
Florence Brunetti 
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CRIMINAL CODE 76-6-402 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft 
or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will 
cause fear for the safety of another; or 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he 
enters or remains on property as to which notice against 
entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the 
owner or someone with apparent authority to act for 
the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed 
to exclude intruders; 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to 
the attention of intruders. 
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C misde-
meanor unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which 
event it is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (2Kb) is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the: 
(a) property was open to the public when the actor 
entered or remained; and 
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with 
the owner's use of the property. 1992 
P A R T S 
ROBBERY 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or 
attempts to take personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, against 
his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or 
fear of immediate force against another in the course of 
committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing 
a theft" if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission 
of theft, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 1895 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of 
committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered 
to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
1994 
PART 4 
THEFT 
76-6-401. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real 
estate, tangible and intangible personal property, cap-
tured or domestic animals and birds, written instruments 
or other writings representing or embodying rights con-
cerning real or personal property, labor, services, or oth-
erwise containing anything of value to the owner, com-
modities of a public utility nature such as 
telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and 
trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any 
scientific or technical information, design, process, proce-
dure, formula or invention which the owner thereof in-
tends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring 
about a transfer of possession or of some other legally 
recognized interest in property, whether to the obtainer or 
another; in relation to labor or services, to secure perfor-
mance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make 
any facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious 
object: 
(a) Tb withhold property permanently or for so 
extended a period or to use under such circumstances 
that a substantial portion of its economic value, or of 
the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) lb restore the property only upon payment of a 
reward or other compensation; or 
(c) lb dispose of the property under circumstances 
that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, 
but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore de-
fined or known as common-law larceny by trespassory 
taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and 
embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an 
impression of law or fact that is false and that the 
actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact 
that the actor previously created or confirmed by 
words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment 
of another and that the actor does not now believe to 
be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information 
likely to affect his judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers prop-
erty without disclosing a lien, security interest, ad-
verse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoy-
ment of the property, whether the lien, security 
interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is 
or is not a matter of official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect 
the judgment of another in the transaction, which 
performance the actor does not intend to perform or 
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that 
failure to perform the promise in issue without other 
evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof 
that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the 
promise would not be performed. 1973 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses . 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall 
be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in pos-
session stole the property. 
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an 
interest in the property or service stolen if another person 
also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to 
infringe, provided an interest in property for purposes of 
this subsection shall not include a security interest for the 
repayment of a debt or obligation. 
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor: 
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the 
property or service involved; or 
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right 
to obtain or exercise control over the property or 
service as he did; or 
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76-8-501 CRIMINAL CODE 238 
PART 5 
FALSIFICATION IN OFFICIAL MATTERS 
76-8-501. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Official proceeding" means any proceeding before a 
legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmen-
tal body or official authorized by law to take evidence 
under oath or affirmation, including a notary or other 
person taking evidence in connection with any of these 
proceedings. 
(2) "Material* means capable of affecting the course or 
outcome of the proceeding. A statement is not material if 
it is retracted in the course of the official proceeding in 
which it was made before it became manifest that the 
falsification was or would be exposed and before it sub-
stantially affected the proceeding. Whether a statement is 
material is a question of law to be determined by the 
COUrt. 1973 
76-8-502. False or inconsistent material statements. 
A person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if in any 
official proceeding: 
(1) He makes a false material statement under oath or 
affirmation or swears or affirms the truth of a material 
statement previously made and he does not believe the 
statement to be true; or 
(2) He makes inconsistent material statements under 
oath or affirmation, both within the period of limitations, 
one of which is false and not believed by him to be true. In 
a prosecution under this section, it need not be alleged or 
proved which of the statements is false but only that one 
or the other was false and not believed by the defendant to 
be true. 1973 
76-8-503. False or inconsistent statements. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if: 
(1) He makes a false statement under oath or affirma-
tion or swears or affirms the truth of the statement 
previously made and he does not believe the statement to 
be true if: 
(a) The falsification occurs in an official proceed-
ing, or is made with a purpose to mislead a public 
servant in performing his official functions; or 
(b) The statement is one which is required by law 
to be sworn or affirmed before a notary or other 
person authorized to administer oaths; or 
(2) He makes inconsistent statements under oath or 
affirmation, both within the period of limitations, one of 
which is false and not believed by him to be true. In a 
prosecution under this section, it need not be alleged or 
proved which of the statements is false but only that one 
or the other was false and not believed by the defendant to 
be true. 
(3) No person shall be guilty under this section if he 
retracts the falsification before it becomes manifest that 
the falsification was or would be exposed. 1973 
76-8-504. Written false statement. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if: 
(1) He makes a written false statement which he does 
not believe to be true on or pursuant to a form bearing a 
notification authorized by law to the effect that false 
statements made therein are punishable; or 
(2) With intent to deceive a public servant in the 
performance of his official function, he: 
(a) Makes any written false statement which he 
does not believe to be true; or 
(b) Knowingly creates a false impression in a writ-
ten application for any pecuniary or other benefit by 
omitting information necessary to prevent state-
ments therein from being misleading; or 
(c) Submits or invites reliance on any writing 
which he knows to be lacking in authenticity; or 
(d) Submits or invites reliance on any sample, 
specimen, map, boundary mark, or other object which 
he knows to be false. 
(3) No person shall be guilty under this section if he 
retracts the falsification before it becomes manifest that 
the falsification was or would be exposed. 1973 
76-8-505. Perjury or false swearing — Proof of falsity 
of statements — Denial of criminal guilt. 
(1) On any prosecution for perjury or false swearing, except 
a prosecution upon inconsistent statements, pursuant to Sub-
section 76-8-502(2), falsity of a s ta tement may not be estab-
lished solely through contradiction by the testimony of a single 
witness. 
(2) No prosecution shall be brought under this par t when 
the substance of the defendant's false s tatement is his denial 
of guilt in a previous criminal trial. 1973 
76-8-506. Provision of false information to law en-
forcement officers, government agencies, or 
specified professionals. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he: 
(1) knowingly gives or causes to be given false informa-
tion to any law enforcement officer with a purpose of 
inducing the officer to believe tha t another has committed 
an offense; or 
(2) knowingly gives or causes to be given to any law 
enforcement officer, any state or local government agency 
or personnel, or to any person licensed in this state to 
practice social work, psychology, or marriage and family 
therapy, information concerning the commission of an 
offense, knowing that the offense did not occur or knowing 
that he has no information relating to the offense or 
danger. 1988 
76-8-507. False personal information to peace officer. 
A person commits a class C misdemeanor if, with intent of 
misleading a peace officer as to his identity, birth date, or place 
of residence, he knowingly gives a false name, birth date, or 
address to a peace officer in the lawful discharge of his official 
duties. 198S 
76-8-508. Tampering with witness — Retaliation 
against witness or informant — Bribery — 
Communicating a threat. 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing 
that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about 
to be instituted, he at tempts to induce or otherwise cause a 
person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, 
item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evi-
dence; or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation 
to which he has been summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he: 
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for any-
thing done by another as a witness or informant; 
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in 
consideration of his doing any of the acts specified under 
Subsection (1); or 
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reason-
able person would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury 
to the person, because of any act performed or to be 
performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or 
informant in an official proceeding or investigation. |9W 
0 0 0 6 6 P 
